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Abstract 
This paper provides a methodology for the risk assessment of deep water floating wind turbine substructures, developed as part of 
the EU H2020 LIFES50+ project. The methodology developed draws on good practice for risk assessment and risk management 
and is designed to be flexible enough to be applicable to different types of risk. This paper deals with four categories: technology 
risks, manufacturing risks, health, safety and environmental (HSE) risks, and commercialisation risks. Each of these areas of risk 
are assessed using a bespoke method and at all stages of the technology’s lifecycle process, from design through to 
decommissioning. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Peer-review under responsibility of SINTEF Energi AS. 
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1. Introduction 
The ability to understand and assess risk (either qualitatively or quantitatively) when developing new substructures 
for floating wind turbines is essential. Risk assessment should provide a sound appreciation of potential risks related 
to the design, manufacture, deployment, operation and decommissioning of new substructures for floating wind turbine 
designs. To date, risk assessment of substructures for floating wind turbines has been performed using various generic 
risk assessment guidelines and standards, such as [1-3]. Whilst providing an overall structure and guidance to risk 
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assessment, these guidelines lack sufficient detail and cohesion to evaluate risk associated with innovative 
substructures for floating wind turbine designs across multiple dimensions of risk and over the full lifecycle of the 
substructure. To resolve this, a bespoke risk assessment methodology for substructures of floating wind turbines has 
been developed as part of the Horizon2020 project ‘Qualification of innovative floating substructures for 10MW wind 
turbines and water depths greater than 50m’ [4] (also known as LIFES50+). 
To provide a broad and consistent overview of risk, the methodology considers four areas of risk: Technology risk, 
Health, Safety and Environmental (HSE) risk, Manufacturing risk, and Commercialisation risk. Each area was 
reviewed in detail and a bespoke method of risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation was developed for 
each. Where possible, common risk assessment techniques were utilised. Standard risk matrices were developed based 
on risk severity and probability categories defined for each relevant risk area. 
This paper starts by giving a brief introduction to the overall process of risk assessment and management, 
highlighting the core structure of these. It is then followed by four sections covering the four risk areas described 
above, giving an overview of different methods and techniques used in each. This paper is a condensed version of the 
full publication ‘Risk management for deep water substructures’ [5] produced for the LIFES50+ project and the 
original work should be consulted for additional information. Note that the paper focuses on development of a 
consistent risk assessment methodology for substructures of floating wind turbines. For additional discussion of 
integrating risk management into the offshore wind industry and the associated challenges see [6]. 
2. Risk assessment and management 
The activities of all types of organisations are exposed to potential hazards, due to both external influences and to 
the nature of their operations [2]. This exposure, coupled with the potential consequences of the hazards, creates risk. 
This risk can be assessed via a series of activities designed to identify, analyse and evaluate the potential risks. Risks 
can be managed by identifying actions to be taken to mitigate or treat the source or the consequence and can be 
accepted when the risk is As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). Risks may also be considered acceptable if 
they are seen as an inherent or necessary part of the technology development process (Fig. 1). Key to the management 
process is an understanding of the risks associated with the system in question. 
2.1. Risk identification 
Sources of risk or hazards are elements which alone or in combination have the intrinsic potential to give rise to 
risk [2]. A systematic approach to identifying these is required to ensure all relevant sources of risk and hazards are 
identified. One such approach is the Hazard Identification (HAZID). 
2.1.1. Hazard identification (HAZID) 
HAZID is the systematic identification of reasonably foreseeable hazards, hazardous situations and events [3]. A 
hazard is a ‘source of potential harm’ [7] (harm being defined as a negative impact on a desired objective rather than 
just physical harm to a person). Methods for identifying hazards can be split into two broad categories, as per [2]: 
 
x Data Driven Methodologies – where recorded observations are available and can be used to identify hazards. 
x Qualitative Methodologies – where hazards are identified based on discussions, interviews and brainstorming. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The risk management process. 
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In the context of floating wind, hazard identification should not be data-driven only, as this would assume that all 
potential hazards have been realised and recorded. This is improbable as the industry is immature and so any 
observation-based dataset will be incomplete. Instead a workshop-based, qualitative, methodology based on expert 
judgement should ensure comprehensive coverage of hazards. 
2.2. Risk analysis 
Risk analysis is the process of comprehending the nature of risk (i.e. what is the risk? what are its causes and 
sources?) and determining the level of risk. Risk is expressed in terms of consequence and probability: consequence 
is the impact of the hazard if it is realised; probability is a measure of the likelihood of the consequence occurring. 
2.2.1. Assessment of consequence and probability 
Typically, both consequence and probability are measured for purposes of risk assessment by placement on a 5-
point scale [8,9], as shown in Table 1. The specific type of harm associated with the points on this scale will be 
contextual, depending on the type of risk assessment being carried out – it could be, for example, harm to persons, 
harm to the environment, harm to the business objectives or harm to the business financial prospects. An example 
scale for consequence to persons, ranging from lowest to highest impact, is given on the left side of Table 1. 
Probability of harm, shown on the right-hand side of Table 1, can be estimated in a number of ways ranging from 
qualitative methods, such as expert judgement, to quantitative methods such as mathematical modelling or based on 
historical data. The most appropriate approach to take will depend on how developed or well documented the data on 
historical incidents are, and on the nature of the risk being addressed. As per the recommended approach to HAZID 
(see Section 2.1.1) floating wind turbines are more likely to lend themselves to a qualitative approach due to the 
immaturity of the technology. 
Table 1. Consequence and probability scale [9]. 
Scale  Category Example Consequence Description  Category Example Probability Description 
5  Extensive Multiple deaths  Very Likely Almost certain to occur 
4  Major Single death  Likely Likely to occur 
3  Severe Serious injury  Probable Possible to occur 
2  Moderate Moderate injury  Possible Possible but not likely to occur 
1  Minor Minor injury  Unlikely Unlikely to occur, although in theory a 
possibility 
2.3. Risk evaluation 
Probability of occurrence and consequence of the hazard can be combined into a matrix form [8,9] to enable an 
overall evaluation of risk. The risk matrix allows prioritisation for risk reduction of those hazards that are of high 
probability and high consequence. The risk matrix approach also enables a final risk score to be assigned to each of 
the hazards by combining the probability and consequence scores, resulting in a manageable number of categories 
despite disparate sources of risk. At the heart of risk evaluation is the comparison of estimated risk levels against some 
benchmark level of acceptable risk (risk criteria). This comparison means decisions can then be made as to whether 
actions need to be taken to reduce risk, depending on where in this matrix each risk appears. 
2.4. Risk treatment 
Risk reduction can be achieved either by reducing the probability of occurrence or by mitigating the consequences 
of the hazard if it were to occur, or by both. In other words, measures should be introduced or actions taken which 
will move the hazard down either the consequence of harm scale or the probability of occurrence scale relative to its 
initial position. 
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2.5. Risk monitoring and review 
Finally, it is important to understand that risk management is a live and continuous process. Risk assessments 
should be revisited periodically to ensure factors that vary over time are not having an undue effect on the risk of the 
system being evaluated. This is particularly relevant during times of sudden or significant change, such as during the 
technology development process. Factors particularly likely to change over time should be identified as part of the 
risk assessment, and data gathered to demonstrate that ongoing monitoring is in place [2]. 
3. Methodology 
The following sections of the paper provide a high level summary of the risk assessment methodology for 
substructures of floating wind turbines developed as part of the LIFES50+ project. The information provided is highly 
concentrated and deals with specificities of this methodology compared to a generic risk assessment methodology. 
For more information and a detailed step-by-step guide for performing risk assessment and management of 
substructures for floating wind turbines see [5]. 
3.1. Technology 
The objective of the technology risk assessment process is to identify risks associated with substructures of floating 
wind turbine technologies which may lead to partial or complete loss of function. Generally speaking technology risks 
may also include risks associated with the areas of health, safety and environment, manufacturing and 
commercialisation in relation to the specific technology being assessed. However, in the context of the LIFES50+ 
project technology risk assessment is primarily concerned with risk to the loss of function. Technical risk assessment 
is initiated by identifying novel elements of technology. This places particular emphasis on the risk associated with 
innovative aspects of the substructure designs rather than with the entire structure. 
Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) [10] are commonly used within industry as a measure of maturity for 
technology development. Whilst TRLs provide a common understanding of technology readiness and can assist in 
risk management, their primarily purpose is not to perform risk assessment but to broadly define what activities need 
to be completed to progress a design towards the next stage of validation. As such, it is recommend that the TRL 
methodology, if applied, be complemented by other ways of assessing technology qualification status which are more 
focused on risk [8]. This can be achieved via a decomposition analysis and technology categorisation of floating 
substructure technologies. 
3.1.1. Technology composition analysis 
A technology can be the integration of multiple element technologies within a system (e.g. the overall substructure) 
or a single element (e.g. a bolt). In order to understand the novel elements, and subsequent individual and cumulative 
risk associated with them, the system should be decomposed into elements. 
The system (a substructures for a floating wind turbine concept) can be subdivided into functions (e.g. stability, 
structural integrity), sub-systems (e.g. mooring system, crew transfer system) and elements (e.g. anchors, mooring 
lines). A functional decomposition of substructures for floating wind turbines, developed as part of the LIFES50+ 
project, is given in [5]. An analysis of each of the identified functional elements across the entire lifecycle of a 
substructures for floating wind turbine concept should be performed. This will generate a complete breakdown of each 
system, sub-system and element within the concept and help identify hazards that might otherwise have been missed. 
3.1.2. Technology categorisation 
Advances in technology are generally evolutionary from proven technology [8]. Only particular elements of the 
technology are typically novel. Uncertainty and risk are generally associated with novel elements. However, the 
uncertainty surrounding a technology is driven not only by its novelty but also by the application of the technology. 
In order to prioritise and focus on the areas of most uncertainty and therefore highest risk, the identified 
technologies from the technology composition analysis should be categorised with respect to the degree of novelty 
and the area of application. 
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For each element identified in the technology decomposition, a technology categorisation can be defined by using 
the matrix shown in Table 2. All elements categorised as ‘New Technology’ (Category 2, 3 or 4) should be taken 
forward in the technology risk assessment process for further analysis. Category 1 technologies can be considered as 
‘Proven Technology’ and require no further technology risk assessment. 
  Table 2. Technology categorisation [8]. 
Application Area 
 Degree of Novelty of Technology 
 Proven Limited Field History New or Unproven 
Known  1 2 3 
Limited Knowledge  2 3 4 
New  3 4 4 
 
Once the novel elements of the technology have been identified, technology risk assessment can be taken further 
by performing risk analysis, evaluation and treatment as per the procedures outlined in Section 2. The failure mode of 
each novel element can be identified by using a Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). An 
example FMECA sheet developed for substructures of floating wind turbine assessment can be found in [5]. 
3.2. Health, safety and environment 
Health, safety and environment risks relating to substructures of floating wind turbine designs should be assessed 
for various stages of the project life cycle (i.e. manufacture, assembly, commissioning, operation and maintenance, 
and decommissioning). As health, safety and environment covers many diverse risks, it is recommended that health 
and safety, and environment are split into two separate categories with dedicated techniques for each used. 
3.2.1. Health and safety 
In the absence of dedicated protective measure standards for floating wind turbines, the governing health and safety 
standard applicable to the design of offshore wind turbines, including their substructures, is EN 50308 [11]. The EN 
50308 standard [11] applies only to health and safety of personnel. Additionally, only commissioning, operations and 
maintenance of onshore wind turbines is covered. For information on manufacture, assembly, commissioning, 
operation and maintenance, and decommissioning of offshore wind turbines, and environment, alternative sources of 
information are required. However no specific guidelines in these areas appear to exist. 
RenewableUK, the UK’s leading non for profit renewable energy trade association, has identified 24 different 
categories of risk relating to health and safety for offshore wind and marine energy [12]. These include, but are not 
limited to, access and egress, fire, noise, vessel selection and remote working, and should be used as guidance in 
HAZID (to help identify health and safety hazards). However, as the provided list of risk categories by [12] is rather 
generic, some floating wind specific health and safety risk categories are not accounted for (e.g. ballasting, anchor 
installation, hook-up). Therefore, it is important to consider floating wind turbine-specific risks in addition to the risk 
categories provided in [12]. 
3.2.2. Environment 
The methodology developed for environmental risk assessment is based on Guidelines for Environmental Risk 
Assessment and Management – Green Leaves III [13]. 
The Source-Pathway-Receptor (SPR) and/or Source-Pathway-Receptor-Consequence (SPRC) concept can be used 
in environmental assessment to identify the link between a hazard and risk. SPRC, as opposed to SPR, can also be 
used to quantify damage or benefits expressed in financial terms. In these concepts, the source or contaminant is 
something that has potential to harm environment (including human life), the pathway is the means by which exposure 
might occur, the receptor is something that could be harmed and consequence is harm expressed in financial terms. It 
should be noted that a potential risk is only created when a link between the different elements of SPR exists, as shown 
in Fig. 2. Without the linkage these elements can exist completely independently and not pose any risk. 
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Fig. 2. SPR and SPRC flow diagram. 
Health and safety, and environmental hazards are typically qualitative and identified by a risk workshop (HAZID) 
rather than by quantitative data. For the purpose of the LIFES50+ project [4] an example HSE HAZID worksheet for 
floating substructure technologies has been developed [5]. In addition to identifying hazards for specific lifecycle 
phases (from design to decommissioning) and their supporting evidence, each hazard should also be identified to be 
generic or site specific, and assigned a dimension of HSE risk (Table 3). 
The target safety level applicable to structures in offshore wind farms is highlighted in Table 3. In the context of 
floating wind turbines, implications for personal injury and pollution, economic consequence and human life are 
considered to be in the ‘Normal’ safety class [14]. 
       Table 3. Safety classes for offshore wind turbine structures (including substructures) [14]. 
  Dimensions of Risk 
Safety Class 
 Risk to Personal 
Injury 
Potential Pollution/ 
Societal Losses 
Potential Economic 
Consequence 
Risk to Human Life 
Low  Low Low Low Negligible 
Normal  Some Some Significant Some 
High  High Possibilities Significant/Major Very Large High Possibilities for Fatality 
 
Note that multiple dimensions of risk could be applicable to one HSE hazard. For example, use of hazardous 
substances in manufacturing can pose a potential risk to both human health (risk of personal injury and to human life) 
and environment (potential pollution). Specification of risk dimension allows this ambiguity to be eliminated. 
3.3. Manufacturing 
The objective of the manufacturing risk assessment is to identify any manufacturing related hazards, such as cost, 
schedule and quality, and to perform risk assessment of these. 
Manufacturing risks should be assessed in conjunction with the Manufacturing Readiness Level (MRL) indicator 
[15]. In early stages of technology development, MRL focuses on manufacturing feasibility by identifying and 
reducing the production risk of the proposed concept [8]. 
The U.S. DoD MRL Deskbook [15] has defined nine manufacturing risk areas, called threads, which are generally 
considered as critical for successful manufacturing, namely: technology and the industrial base; design; cost and 
funding; materials; process capability and control; quality management; manufacturing workforce; facilities; and 
manufacturing management. These can be further split into 22 sub-threads which should be used as a starting point 
for manufacturing risk identification using a structured HAZID (see [5] for an example). 
MRLs and TRLs are highly interlinked and can be mapped against each other, as shown in Fig. 3 (based on [16]). 
It is not uncommon for TRLs to lead MRLs as product design and technology have to be established before the 
manufacturing processes can truly mature. 
For those systems, sub-systems and elements that do not meet the target MRLs (set as part of manufacturing 
assessment basis), a Manufacturing Maturation Plan (MMP) should be developed and implemented to eliminate or 
reduce risk to some predefined acceptable level. This should include a description of the approach to resolve the risk, 
how much it will cost, what resources are available and what impact will this have on the schedule. 
Source Pathway Receptor Consequence
Source-Pathway-Receptor (SPR)
Source-Pathway-Receptor-Consequence (SPRC)
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Fig. 3. Mapping of TRLs to MRLs. 
3.4. Commercialisation 
Commercialisation risk covers those aspects of risk related to bringing a new product to market, including non-
technological considerations such as regulatory environment, financial performance and proposition, and market 
opportunities [17,18]. A risk assessment for the commercialisation dimension of a novel substructure for a floating 
wind turbine design should account for the ‘hazards’ that could be encountered in each of these areas, including those 
related to the permitting process, certification of new technology, compatibility between wind turbine and 
substructure, attaining environmental consents, the regulatory environment for new or innovative designs, and the 
potential impact of commercial risk on levelised cost of energy. Note that, particularly in the context of 
commercialisation, there is also scope for opportunity, or upside, in each of these aspects. Therefore, although the 
term commercialisation ‘risk’ is used, it should be taken to mean an assessment of commercialisation risk and 
opportunity, as both hazards and strengths may be identified via this process [18]. 
Assessment of commercial readiness can be made with reference to the Commercial Readiness Index (CRI) [17]. 
The CRI consists of six levels of readiness ranging from that which is applicable to a technology which is still a 
hypothetical commercial proposition through to that which is applicable to a technology considered as a bankable 
asset class. A full description of each of the six levels of the commercial readiness index is given in [17]. 
The way in which the CRI relates to TRL is shown in Fig. 4 [17]: even high-TRL concepts are still low-CRI 
concepts, i.e. even when much of the technology risk has been removed a high degree of commercial uncertainty 
surrounding the demonstration and deployment of that technology will remain. This is because TRL progression 
typically covers technology development whilst still a hypothetical commercial proposition and does not extend 
beyond the basis of small-scale trials [17]. Only on moving beyond the technology readiness levels does an asset class 
become bankable such that investment decisions are no longer driven by technology risks [19]. Nonetheless the 
significant focus of a commercialisation risk assessment should be on early stage development of a technology to 
ensure that it is being developed, designed and validated in such a way that it will reduce in risk as development 
progresses. This will eventually enable it to satisfy the risk appetite of potential investors [20] and will also benefit 
the technology developers themselves, as the majority of costs of new product development are determined by 
decisions made at the start of the innovation process but incurred during commercialisation [18]. Hence an awareness 
of the implications of technology decisions for commercialisation at the early stages of a project will benefit the full 
process of innovation and development for multiple stakeholders.  
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Fig. 4. Relationship between TRL and CRI. 
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In the context of substructures for floating wind turbines, the general process of risk assessment outlined in Section 
2 was combined with dimensions of commercial readiness derived from the CRI to arrive at a recommended process 
for quantifying the commercialisation risk of the floating substructure concepts. This uses the eight dimensions used 
to judge commercial readiness as a basis also for quantifying commercialisation risk, namely regulatory environment, 
stakeholder acceptance, technical performance, financial performance (costs), financial proposition (revenues), 
industry supply chain and skills, market opportunities and company maturity [17]. Specific sub-categories of each of 
these dimensions which could be measured when assessing commercialisation risk are suggested in [5] and should be 
used as a starting point in the HAZID (see Section 2.1.1) for commercial risk identification. A full example of the 
process of risk assessment relating to commercialisation based on these dimensions and on the general procedure 
outlined in Section 2 is found in [5]. 
4. Conclusion 
By using and adapting a standard methodology for risk assessment, early risk identification, analysis, evaluation 
and treatment of those risks relating to the design of floating substructure technologies can be performed. When 
applied as part of a holistic risk management process the procedures outlined in this paper should lead to de-risking 
of floating wind technology not just in terms of the technological risks associated with innovations in engineering but 
also in terms of the manufacturing, HSE and commercialisation risks. 
Whilst the methodology for risk assessment presented in this paper was developed for the purpose of assessing four 
different substructures for floating wind turbine designs of the LIFES50+ project, the process is applicable to other 
new substructures of floating wind turbine designs and, in theory, to other floating substructures outside of those 
proposed within the wind energy industry. 
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